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I.
1Introduction
Less than a year after scientist Ian Wilmut announced the birth of Dolly, the
world's rst cloned sheep, entrepreneur and physicist Richard Seed stated on
National Public Radio that he intended to establish a for-prot clinic to clone
human beings as soon as the technology was available.1 An immediate, visceral
reaction to the prospect of human cloning reverberated throughout the nation
and the rest of the world, as private and public organizations alike rushed to
impose moratoriums,2 pass legislation,3 and appeal to scientists' morality4 to
suppress any attempts to clone a human being. In the thick of this debate it
became apparent that no existing arm of the federal government had jurisdic-
tion to monitor privately-funded research. The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) then stepped forward and asserted that it, in fact, did have authority
to regulate human cloning under the Public Health Service Act and the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.5
1Steve Sternberg, Entrepreneur Plans to Clone Babies for Childless Couples, USA Today,
January 7, 1998, at 01A.
2See, e.g., Executive Summary, Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of
the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, June 1997, at iii (recommending a continuation
of the moratorium on federal funding for research on human embryos); AMA Recommends
Voluntary Moratorium on Human Cloning, American Medical Association Press Release, Feb.
17, 1998.
3See, e.g., Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2, at iv, recommending that federal legisla-
tion be enacted to bar any attempts at human cloning. In response to the NBAC's recommen-
dation, Congress introduced The Cloning Prohibition Act of 1997 and the Human Cloning
Researched Prohibition Act. See Kimberley M. Jackson, Well, Hello Dolly! The Advent of
Cloning Legislation and its Constitutional Implications, 52 SMU Law Review 283, 289-291
(1999). The rst Act was voted down due to its breadth and the haste with which it was
drafted, see Matthew M. Merrill, The Sheep Heard `Round the World: Legislation vs. Self-
Regulation of Human Cloning, 7-SPG Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 169, 179 (Spring 1998);
the second bill has yet to pass as well. See Caroline Daniel, Conicting Aims Leave Ban on
Human Cloning in Limbo, Washington Post, July 26, 1998, at A8 [hereinafter Conicting
Aims].
4See, e.g., W.H.A.50.37, Fiftieth World Health Assembly, 10th Plenary Mtg, (May 14,
1997) (condemning human cloning as \ethically unacceptable").
5See Dear Colleague Letter from Stuart L. Nightingale, Associate Commissioner (Oct. 26,
2Since then the dust has settled. More than one legal scholar has questioned
the FDA's claim to authority,6 and the FDA itself concedes to be re-evaluating
its position.7 While legal scholars struggle to dene the scope of the FDA's
power, ethical scholars appear engaged in a debate over the moral implications
of cloning a human.8 What these groups have failed to address satisfactorily,
and what I intend to resolve, is how these two debates are intertwined and how
they can be disentangled. While the bounds of FDA authority may appear no
more complicated than any other academic legal question, I intend to show that
by regulating human cloning the FDA necessarily takes a stand in the currently
ongoing ethical debate in which it should remain neutral.
The FDA must both establish its authority to regulate and, if it nds the
authority, must do so within the connes of its stated mission. If cloning falls
within the FDA's regulatory authority, the agency can either restrict its de-
velopment in the laboratory or prohibit its post-experimental introduction into
interstate commerce. To do so in either case it must nd that some threat to hu-
man safety exists, 9 either to the clones themselves or to larger society. During
1998) (available on FDA website).
6See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Price, Does the FDA Have Authority to Regulate Human Cloning?,
11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 619 (Summer, 1998) (concluding that a statutory amendment would
be necessary); see also Conicting Aims, supra note 3, quoting Professors Richard Merrill
and Lori Andrews.
7See Conicting Aims, supra note 3 (\As it turns out, the FDA is not comfortable with
its position, and has set up a working group...").
8See, e.g., Executive Summary, supra note 2.
9Once a product has reached the marketing stage, the FDA can also seize it if it is deemed
\misbranded"; however, since human cloning has yet to be developed and marketed, it is
impossible to predict what types of violations might arise on a case by case basis. For this
reason I consider the issue of misbranding to be beyond the scope of this paper.
3its experimental stage, however, I argue that cloning poses no threat that can
be articulated outside of the current moral debate on human embryo research.
Once cloning is developed and marketed, moreover, it becomes even more ap-
parent that the fear of immoral consequences, rather than unsafe products, is
at work. For these reasons, I will argue that, even should the FDA conclude
that it has some authority to regulate human cloning, doing so would violate its
mission to remain neutral in the face of ethical disagreement. The desire to reg-
ulate human cloning, I contend, stems purely from anticipation of adverse moral
consequences, not from safety concerns. Even if one can t cloning within the
bounds of a statutory denition (though I present arguments that one can not),
the FDA nonetheless has no authority to take a position in an ethical debate,
and therefore should remain uninvolved in the debate on human cloning.
II.
The FDA's Claim to Authority is Statutory, Not Moral
The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 states that
the mission of the FDA is to \promote the public health by promptly and ef-
ciently reviewing clinical research"10 and by ensuring that drugs and medical
devices are \safe and eective."11 If the FDA nds that any product subject
10Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 [hereinafter FDA Mod-
ernization Act], x406(b)(1).
11Id. x406(b)(2) and x406(b)(3). See also Agriculture, Rural Development, and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1990, S. Rep. No. 101-84 (2d Sess. 1989), stating
that the mission of the FDA is to ensure safety and eectiveness of food, cosmetics, human
and animal drugs, biological products, and therapeutic devices.
4to its regulation does not meet its standards, it may seize the product,12 bring
an injunction restraining its distribution,13 or seek criminal prosecution of the
manufacturer's high-level employees.14 The FDA does not list bioethical in-
quiry as among its obligations, nor does the agency see itself in such a role.
Specic to the context of human cloning, former Chief Counsel to the FDA
Richard A. Merrill has stated that \[t]he FDA is not equipped, either by law
or personnel, to grapple with...the wider social issues involved."15 The gov-
ernment already has such a body, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(NBAC), to debate such issues when determining when research can ethically
receive federal funding.16 State courts fulll a similar role for privately-funded
research as well as all issues conned to intrastate commerce.17 I will argue
below that the FDA|in the absence of more than a moral debate|should play
no role in regulating human cloning technology because this existing framework
is sucient for the government, if it so desires, to take a moral stance on cloning
without imposing constraints on private actors who reach dierent moral con-
clusions. First, however, I will present evidence in this section that the FDA,
moral objections aside, has no statutory authority to regulate human cloning.
12Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act [hereinafter FDCA] x304.
13FDCA x302.
14FDCA x303.
15See Conicting Aims, supra note 3.
16The NBAC assumed a high-prole role in the debate on the ethics of human cloning,
following Wilmut's announcement of his successful experiment with Dolly, and was responsible
for advising President Clinton on an appropriate response. See, e.g., Cloning Human Beings:
Responding to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission's Report, 27 Hastings Center
Rep. 6 (Sept-Oct. 1997).
17California, for example, has already passed a statute banning human cloning. See Kenton
Abel, 1997 California Legislative Service 688 (West)|Human Cloning, 13 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 465 (1998).
5A.
The Statutory Role of the FDA
The FDA derives its authority from the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act of 193818 (FDCA) and related laws19 to require compliance with standards
of safety and eectiveness for anything falling within the statutory denition
of a food, a drug, a cosmetic, a medical device, or a biological product. If a
product falls within the drug denition of FDCA x201(g) or the device deni-
tion of x201(h), it is regulated by xx501-600. The producer of a drug, under
these sections of the Act, may not market the product until it has complied
with rigorous pre-clinical and clinical trial requirements, subject to oversight by
an Institutional Review Board (IRB) and led a New Drug Application (NDA)
pursuant to x505. Similarly, biological products require a biological product
license, and medical devices require a pre-market approval application (PMA).
The FDA thus regulates how and when these products reach commercial mar-
kets, and can impose certain safety requirements on the procedures of the pre-
market laboratory research. The FDA does not, however, dictate the types of
products that can be developed, nor does it determine whether use of these
products meets a pre-determined moral guideline. Its role is conned to over-
sight of clinical trials, post-experimental assurance of safety and eectiveness
of new products, and mandates of compliance with certain manufacturing stan-
1821 U.S.C.A. xx301 et seq.
19See, e.g., the Biologics Act, 42 U.S.C. x262, the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
x264, and the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 4511.
6dards.20 The FDA's ability to regulate human cloning in this manner depends
on its ability to t cloning technology within a precedented construction of one
of the denitions for drugs, medical devices, or biological products.
B.
Possible FDA Sources of Authority in the Case of Human Cloning
To t human cloning within the scope of the FDA's statutory authority,
one must nd a denition within the FDCA or accompanying statute which
it meets. For this purpose it is helpful to have a rudimentary understanding
of how the cloning technique of scientist Ian Wilmut works. After providing a
brief summary of the technology, I will argue that|assuming human cloning
technology will work in a similar way|the statutes establishing the FDA's ju-
risdiction have denitions which would require highly tortured constructions to
bring cloning under FDA control.
1.
Nuclear Somatic Transfer
Dolly was cloned by a variant of the technique of nuclear somatic transfer
(NST) called \fusion." In this process, an egg cell is \enucleated" (the nucleus
is removed) and placed next to an adult donor cell and fused with an electric
current. This current also activates the egg's development and a pre-embryo be-
20See Statement of Policy for Regulating Biotechnology Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,309
(1986).
7gins to develop. The fusion process causes the mitochondria of both the donor
cell and the egg cell to mix. (In strict NST, only the egg cell's mitochondria are
present because the adult cell's nucleus is directly implanted into the enucleated
egg without the pulse of the electric current.) This technique, unlike past at-
tempts, allowed Wilmut to use dierentiated, specialized adult cells.21 The egg
then must be implanted in a surrogate mother's womb and gestated normally.
The implications of this scientic breakthrough extend far beyond the simple
ability to create a genetic twin asexually. One author summarizes the possible
applications of Wilmut's research:
[Wilmut] believes that his techniques oer great promises for humans. In-
deed, many scientists think that his real achievement may not be in cloning
but in allowing us to understand and control cellular dierentiation, to derive
undierentiated cells from dierentiated cells, to understand how cells age, and
to treat diseases caused by mitochondrial DNA. There is also the possibility
of cell-based therapy with fusion of a nucleus to an egg for some diseases....
[Wilmut] also thinks his techniques will be used in biotechnology to accomplish
gene targeting, the insertion of a specic human gene in every cell of a lamb's
body.... The most exciting prospect here is to modify a sheep CTFR gene to
create a model of cystic brosis (CF) for gene therapy.... Finally, Wilmut's
techniques should help create genetically-altered organs of pigs, such that these
new organs would have less chance of rejection in transplantation into dying
humans.22
Others have pointed to the possibility of directing development in order to
clone human organs for transplant, a technological innovation that could reduce
or eliminate today's lengthy waiting lists for organs.23
21Gregory E. Pence, Who's Afraid of Human Cloning? 11-12 (1998).
22Id. at 12-13.
23See Price, supra note 6, at 631, citing Joan Stephenson, Threatened Bans on Human
Cloning Research Could Hamper Advances, 270 JAMA 1022, 1023. This paper, however, is
not intended to extend to the case of human organs, the therapeutic purpose of which may
result in a more plausible classication as a biological product or drug and thus come within
FDA jurisdiction.
82. The Statutory Denitions
In 1983 the FDA issued a statement conceding that it lacked authority to
regulate human organ transplants;24 this statement, by analogy, also provides a
comprehensive guideline for analyzing its authority to regulate human cloning.
The FDA acknowledged that, in order to regulate human organs and to take a
stance on the possibility of human organ sales, an organ transplant would have
to be classied as either a \drug," a \device," or a \biological product," and
concluded that to do so would stretch the relevant statutes beyond accepted
constructions.25 Similarly, human cloning must be classied under one of these
headings to come under FDA control, and attempting to do so results in the
same dubious interpretations of commonly understood terms.
First, it is clear that the process of human cloning should not be considered a
drug. The FDCA denes \drug" broadly as \articles intended for use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man" and as
\articles (other than food) intended to aect the structure or any function of the
body of man."26 Arguably, both a human organ's transplantation and a human
clone's creation could fall within this broad denition of \drug" because both
aect the structure and function of the body, but the FDA has acknowledged
in its own statement that \[s]uch an interpretation, while arguably supportable,
would extend the legal denition beyond the traditional medical concept of the
24Statement by the Food and Drug Administration Concerning its Legal Authority to Regu-
late Human Organ Transplants and to Prohibit Their Sale: Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight, House Committee on Science and Technology, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter Statement by the FDA]. The FDA has since shown evidence of
re-considering this statement.
25Id.
26FDCA x201(g)(1)(B) and (C).
9term `drug."'27 Furthermore, its own administrative interpretation claried that
a drug should be regarded as \a chemical or a combination of chemicals," not as
an actual human structure.28 Since all stages of NST involve use of biological
matter, not manufactured chemicals, and the end result would be the creation of
life, interpreting the statutory denition of \drug" to encompass human cloning
would stretch the bounds of plausibility.29
The second possible source of FDA authority lies in statutory classication of
cloning as a \device." x201(h) of the FDCA denes \device" as \an instru-
ment, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent,
or other...article...which is...intended to aect the structure or function of
the body of man."30 Again, this \structure or function" denition is broad
enough to t human cloning within its scope, but a practical analysis also ren-
ders such an interpretation unlikely. The FDA's statement on organ transplants
discounts an extension of this denition to human products. In addition to an
argument based on the Act's legislative history, the FDA reasons that items
listed in the denition indicate an intention to include man-made articles only.
In vitro reagents, a possible exception to this characterization, are nonetheless
used as a means of diagnosis and thus seem included because they are \use-
ful for [their] intended purpose rather than simply being substituted for [their]
equivalent material in the human body."31 Human cloning escapes this \useful
27Statement by the FDA, supra note 19.
28See id., quoting 47 FR 46139, (Oct. 15,1982), Merck Sharp & Dohme Research Labora-
tories; Reclassication of Lacrisert as an Approved New Drug).
29See also Price, supra note 6, at 630, concluding that classifying human cloning as a drug
would create the unlikely result of necessitating FDA approval of all creation of human life.
30FDCA x201(h)(3).
31Statement by the FDA, supra note 19.
10for its intended purpose" classication for similar reasons; more than a simple
substitution for a body part, cloning creates a new life that does not serve an
independent medical purpose.32
The nal possibility for an FDA claim to regulatory authority is to regard
human cloning as within the scope of the Public Health Service Act's grant
of authority to regulate \biological products." The denition of a \biological
product" extends to \any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine,
blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous prod-
uct...applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of diseases or injuries of
man...."33 A broad interpretation of \analogous product" might be stretched
to include human cloning as a highly-complex analogue to blood, which the
FDA calls \essentially a liquid organ,"34 but it is clear that cloning a human
does not, in itself, prevent, treat, or cure a disease or injury. The FDA has also
pointed to the legislative history of the Public Health Service Act to conclude
that the denition should be interpreted narrowly.35
In sum, there is no obvious statutory authority for the FDA to regulate human
cloning. One legal scholar has concluded that a statutory amendment could
give the FDA this power,36 but I will argue in the next section that granting
the FDA such authority would be contrary to its mission to ensure public safety
while refraining from ethical inquiry. As I elaborate below, one cannot nd a
32For an argument similar to the FDA's own reasoning, see Price, supra note 6, at 633-638.
3342 U.S.C. x262(a).
34Statement by the FDA, supra note 19.
35See id.
36See Price, supra note 6 at 641.
11threat to human safety in the process of human cloning unless one makes an
inquiry into the purely moral question of when human life begins.
III.
The Ethical Dimension
The FDA has conceded more than once that its authority does not extend to
ethical inquiry.37 If one frames the human cloning debate as one consisting ex-
clusively of conicting moral philosophies|as I will argue that one must|then
it becomes clear that granting the FDA authority to regulate human cloning
would create an irreparable conict with the clearly-dened mission of the Ad-
ministration to focus solely on safety and eectiveness, and would encroach on
the rights of states and advisory boards to engage in extended exploration of
the technology's ethical dimensions and to act on their own conclusions.
A.
The Risk to Human Subjects During the Experimental Stages of Human
Cloning
The FDA has asserted that its ability to halt the experimental stages of
human cloning technology lies in its power to impose a clinical hold on any
study in which safety is uncertain.38 This is so because, if cloning technology
falls within the scope of the FDA's authority-granting statutes by meeting one
of the denitions described in Part II, supra, no entity may conduct clinical
37See Richard Merrill's comments, supra note 11. See also Statement by the FDA, supra
note , stating that \[t]he statutes FDA administers are not intended to deal with the ethical
issues that are involved in the sale of therapeutic products [such as human organs]," thus
indicating the Agency's unwillingness to assume a role in moral policymaking.
38Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 5.
12research without submitting an investigational new drug (IND) application to
the FDA, in which it must establish satisfactory compliance with the FDA's
requirements for such research. These requirements include a detailed plan for
research, authorization from an institutional review board (IRB), and informed
consent from all human subjects. 39 The FDA has stated that its \primary
objectives in reviewing an IND are, in all phases of the investigation, to assure
the safety and rights of subjects, and...to help assure that the quality of the
scientic evaluation of drugs is adequate to permit an evaluation of the drug's
eectiveness and safety."40 Consistent with its unwillingness to involve itself
in ethical inquiries, then, the FDA would be limited to ensuring human safety
during the experimental phases of human cloning.
If the FDA wants to impose a clinical hold on cloning experimentation,
therefore, it must rst identify a threat to human safety. Two possibilities for
such harm can be assumed: either the FDA, in its claim to regulatory authority,
anticipates some danger to the adult participants who donate human cells and
surrogate wombs, or it senses that experimental harm may befall the cloned
human during its development. In the rst instance, the risks are suciently
small to regard informed consent for those subjects as adequate; although some
groups have expressed concern that clones might be developed from cells without
the donor's consent, the existing medical guidelines requiring informed consent
in combination with Constitutional traditions of privacy and reproductive free-
39FDCA x505(i).
4021 C.F.R. x312.22(a).
13dom are adequate to remedy any violations without FDA oversight.41 I therefore
conne my discussion to the more controversial consideration of what risks ex-
perimentation will pose to the cloned humans themselves.
The risks to cloned humans articulated in the debate on NST technology are of
two kinds: those that will be inicted externally on the child or the larger soci-
ety by virtue of his being a clone, and those that will be inicted structurally on
the child due to imperfections in the cloning process. Since the external harms
would occur during the post-experimental stage of cloning technology, I address
these below in Part III.B. The structural harms, however, are relevant to the
experimental phases of the technology, and include the increased risk of disease,
growth abnormalities, DNA mutations caused by environmental and lifestyle
factors of the adult donor, and an accelerated aging process.42 These risks all
apply to the individual clone only; no suspected risks to the public during the
experimental phase can be identied among these projections.
While all of these risks are real, they are in place at the cellular level, and for this
reason the FDA's claim to authority becomes attenuated. 43 Before the FDA
can intervene in cloning experiments to ensure the safety of the possible result-
ing clones, it must rst have reached a determination that a potential human
41See Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Aairs of the American Medical As-
sociation (June 1999). Although Moore v. Regents of the University of California indicates
that one cannot assert a proprietary interest in one's cells, the opinion does state that a cause
of action exists for non-consensual harvesting of another's biological matter if the intended
use is not adequately disclosed. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990),
cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1388 (1991).
42See Merrill, supra note 3, at 171.
43Once the cloned human has been gestated, FDA authority to protect its safety attaches
less ambiguously (still assuming that cloning meets one of its statutorily-dened areas of
authority), but because it argues that it has the power to place a clinical hold on cloning
experiments, see Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 5, it clearly intends to protect these
humans much earlier in their development.
14incurs the moral obligation of protection that it extends to fully-developed (post-
natal) humans. The problem with making such a judgment is that philosophers
and governmental bodies alike disagree as to when potential human life should
incur legal protection at the expense of existing human life.44 The Human
Embryo Research panel of ethical experts established by the National Institute
of Health issued a report in 1994 favoring federal funding for experiments on
human embryos. In 1995, in contrast, Congress banned funding for most such
experiments.45 Meanwhile, Louisiana law denes an embryo as a \juridicial
person,"46 but the Supreme Court case of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey doesn't nd a fetus's claim to life compelling until it
reaches viability.47 These parallel debates on human embryo research and the
ethics of abortion have produced a wide range of legally expressed viewpoints
from which it would be inappropriate for the FDA, as a purely regulatory body,
to choose by unilaterally determining that a human cell should be protected as
a fully-developed human.
The NBAC also characterized the experimental risks to clones as ones grounded
in ethics rather than public safety: \[T]he Commission believes it would vio-
late important ethical obligations were clinicians or researchers to attempt to
create a child using these particular technologies, which are likely to involve
44For philosophical discussion of this debate, see Mary Warren, Do Potential People Have
Moral Rights?, in Obligations to Future Generations 14 (R.I. Sikora & B. Barry eds.,
1978); Peter Singer & Karen Dawson, IVF Technology and the Argument From Potential, 17
Philosophy & Public Affairs 87 (1988).
45Ronald M. Green, Stopping Embryo Research, 9 Health Matrix 235, 238-239 (Summer,
1999).
46Id. at 240.
47505 U.S. 833 (1992).
15unacceptable risks to the fetus and/or potential child" (emphasis supplied). 48
This statement clearly indicates the NBAC's belief that weighing the risks to
potential humans against the benets to the existing humans' body of scientic
knowledge is an ethically-based balancing test, not one of pure objective risks.
Even if the risks to the proto-human matter can be determined objectively,
deciding what weight to assign to the interests of the unborn|as a counter to
the interests of living humans|invokes a hotly contested debate in which the
FDA does not have the resources to engage. Because the NBAC is an advisory
committee on ethics, its assumption in this context that risks to pre-natal hu-
mans are sometimes unacceptable is not adverse to its mission. For the FDA
to extend its regulatory power to prohibit these risks, however, it, too, must
play a role in making ethical determinations as to when a human life should be
created under threat of risk and when it should not.
The cell-based nature of risks to human clones poses a further complication for
the FDA's claim to authority. While it clearly harms a human if one creates a
child with a technique which inicts defects when a safer technique would have
produced the same child without the defects, the risks anticipated in cloning
a child (accelerated aging, expression of detrimental traits, growth abnormali-
ties) are caused by problems intrinsic to the cell, rather than the technique, and
therefore the harm is to dierent children|the one developed from an inferior
cell, and the one developed from a superior cell.49 Although one might argue
that the technique, rather than the cell, is inherently risky if it does not include
48Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2, at iii.
49For a more developed philosophical analysis of \same people choices" versus \dierent
people choices," see generally Derek Part, Reasons and Persons (1984).
16a mechanism for suppressing expression of cellular-level defects, the result is still
the same: the technique which allows the expression creates one child, while the
technique that bypasses the expression creates another. Therefore, in deeming
unsafe a technique which allows expression of some undesirable cellular-level
defects, the FDA is necessarily pronouncing a moral preference for one type of
human life over another. In that sense it is not protecting human life, but rather
is selecting among lives.
The obvious opposition to this argument is that there is a dierence between
deliberately creating a child with defects in a laboratory and inadvertently cre-
ating one through traditional means of procreation. On an intuitive level, it
feels like less of a harm when \nature," rather than a lab technician, allows
development of an embryo with cellular-level defects, but I propose that this
distinction is illusory.50 Presumably the scientist creating a human clone has
found a family that desires to raise it, since slavery|even to scientists|is not
legal in the United States; therefore, this family has consented to the risks in-
herent in producing a child asexually in exactly the same way another couple
implicitly consents to the risks when it creates a child through traditional inter-
course. In other words, some assumption of risk is inherent in any decision to
create life, regardless of how or where; deciding what kinds of procreative risks
are acceptable, assuming that such a decision by government is Constitutionally
permissible,51 is not properly within the mission of the FDA. At the very least,
50The argument that the embryo cannot consent to its creation is irrelevant to this inquiry,
because no embryo can ever consent to its creation, regardless of the method.
51For an exploration of the implications of the Constitutional right of reproductive freedom
for human cloning, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Constitution and the Clone, in Clones and
Clones 207 (Martha C. Nussbaum and Cass R. Sunstein, eds., 1998). See also Kimberly
17an FDA regulation which protects human safety by prescribing when and how
humans may procreate paints out the feared risks with too broad a brush. At
the worst, the FDA would be ignoring its purely regulatory mission and pro-
moting itself to moral arbiter, a role better reserved to others more qualied
and better equipped to make such determinations.
If the FDA wants to place a clinical hold (or any other kind of limitation)
on the experimental stages of human cloning, it must articulate a safety reason
for doing so. I have argued in this section that nding a threat to human safety
requires the FDA rst to ignore divergent legal and public opinions to conclude
that potential humans require legal protection from an administrative body.
Next, it must render moral judgments. It must conclude that these potential
humans face unacceptable risks in the laboratory which are not outweighed by
the interests of living humans and, ultimately, it must determine that humans
born in the face of these risks will be worse o then if they were never born at
all. In sum, it is not enough for the FDA to conclude that risks to potential
humans exist, because these risks only take shape in a dimension of moral
inquiry. Instead, the FDA must argue that these potential risks to potential
humans pose some larger threat to public safety, and that they simply have not
done.
B.
The Risks to Public Safety in Post-Experimental Human Cloning
M. Jackson, Well, Hello Dolly! The Advent of Cloning Legislation and its Constitutional
Implications, 52 SMU L. Rev. 283, 295-296 (Winter 1999).
18The majority of those who fear human cloning technology tend to do so be-
cause of its possible malicious applications once beyond the experimental stage
and widely available. If the FDA can gain statutory authority to regulate hu-
man cloning, the uses to which the technology is put will also fall within its
jurisdiction and it can prohibit cloning altogether if it deems that the conse-
quences of doing so would be unsafe or ineective. It seems impossible, however,
to nd a threat to human safety outside of a conclusion that cloning is somehow
morally harmful. In the words of Professor Laurence Tribe, \the cloning objec-
tion...takes the form of an irreducible appeal to human nature, whether or not
divinely ordained, as the normative source of the case for legal prohibition."52 It
is this \appeal to human nature" that so clearly extends beyond the bounds of
the FDA's regulatory mission. In this section I will discuss the most commonly
predicted undesirable outcomes of widely available technology to clone humans,
propose that such fears are either exaggerated or misplaced, and conclude that
FDA regulation is not appropriate as a means for protecting either society or
the clones themselves.
1.
Post-Experimental Harms to Cloned Children
Common objections to cloning tend to focus on speculation of psychological
harm to the cloned child. The American Medical Association (AMA), in its re-
52Laurence Tribe, On Not Banning Cloning for the Wrong Reasons, in Clones and Clones
221, 227 (Martha C. Nussbaum and Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998).
19port on human cloning, has predicted that it might be psychologically damaging
for a child to know its \genetic predispositions" through knowledge of his genetic
twin's own health. \Having insight into one's potential," the AMA theorizes,
\may cause enormous pressures to live up to expectations (or inappropriately
relieve pressure to do so), even more so than those generally experienced by
children." Furthermore, cloning humans \may exacerbate disturbing motiva-
tions for having children."53 Leaving aside the obvious observation that many
parents of non-cloned children place unreasonable expectations on them, it is
important to note that those expectations which might be specic to cloning
would result from an information asymmetry between scientists and parents,
and not from an FDCA-prohibited ineective product. The solution, therefore,
is to provide more information rather than ban the technology altogether for
fear of its misapprehension.
As one commentator points out, \many initial impressions of the ability to clone
humans are not based in scientic fact. The thought that a person will be ex-
actly like his or her ancestor disregards the fact of social nurturing in the process
of human development."54 Encompassed within the doctrine of informed con-
sent would clearly be the obligation of cloning clinics to explain what parents
could and could not reasonably expect from their cloned child, and thus close
the information gap. Also, as cloning technology becomes available and more
familiar to the public, it is likely that the public will come to understand it
53Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Aairs of the American Medical Associa-
tion, June 1999.
54Matthew M. Merrill, The Sheep Heard `Round the World: Legislation vs. Self-Regulation
of Human Cloning, 7-SPG Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 169, 175-176 (1998).
20better:
Social expectations are malleable and can quickly change. True, parents
might initially have expectations that are too high and other people might
regard such children with prejudice. But just as such inappropriate attitudes
faded after the rst cases of in vitro fertilization, so they would fade here too.55
Another reason that many nd human cloning disturbing is because it gives
parents the power to determine the genetic make-up of their children, and raises
the possibility of a growth in societal discrimination against the genetically
imperfect if it is possible to always reproduce with certain knowledge of the
genetic outcome.56 At best this fear is speculative. At worst, an attempt to
regulate human cloning based on it runs afoul of the equal protection principle
the Supreme Court articulated in Palmore v. Sidoti: \The Constitution cannot
control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may
be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them eect."57
While it is true that parents may have children for the \wrong" reasons and
that cloning technology \may exacerbate" these \disturbing motivations," for
the FDA to prohibit cloning because it fears consumers may use the technology
irresponsibly is, like banning drugs solely to prevent o-label uses when the
approved uses are safe and eective, a total prohibition on benets in favor of
preventing an unproven risk. As bioethicist Gregory Pence questions, \[m]ost
popular discussions about cloning a human assume the worst possible motives
55Gregory E. Pence, Who's Afraid of Human Cloning? 138 (1998).
56See, e.g., Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Aairs of the American Medical
Association (June 1999). See also Merrill, supra note 54 at 173, pointing to criticisms arguing
that any power to manipulate genes will give rise to a eugenics movement similar to the one
in China.
57466 U.S. 429, 433, 104 S.Ct. 1879 (1984).
21in parents, but why on earth make such assumptions? Without evidence?"58
Furthermore, unlike the clear-cut cases of approved and non-approved drug use,
it would be impossible for the FDA to determine what constitutes an \o-
label" use of cloning technology without making some moral determination as
to what constitutes an appropriate motivation for having a child. Again, FDA
involvement in the application of cloning technology would exceed its traditional
role of ethical neutrality.
2.
Post-Experimental Harms to Society
Beyond the fear of psychosocial harms to cloned children themselves is the
fear that widespread human cloning will have an adverse eect on the human
gene pool. Unlike the speculative harms that I described in the preceding sec-
tion, a technology that threatens the gene pool would pose a clearly articulated
threat to public safety which could fall within the FDA's purview. The AMA
describes this potential danger:
In order for human cloning to have a signicant eect on the gene pool,
cloning would have to be widespread, and clones would have to reproduce. If
cloning became widespread, human genetic diversity would decrease. Over time,
the benets of genetic diversity, from having individuals with disease immunity
to fostering a population with a wide variety of talents, have helped human
beings survive and succeed.59
Although lack of genetic diversity can genuinely weaken the health of a
species, regulating human cloning on the basis of this threat would pose a logis-
tical problem bordering on the morally-intrusive for the FDA. First, the AMA
58Pence, supra note 55 at 65.
59Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Aairs of the American Medical Association
(June 1999).
22concedes that gene pool shrinkage is \not the most imminent threat" inherent
in human cloning;60 as Gregory Pence claries, to argue that human cloning
will cause such a prominent problem \commits the all-or-nothing fallacy: either
all human reproduction is going to be asexual reproduction or none is." As long
as sexual reproduction continues on a substantial scale, problems with the gene
pool should not surface. In fact, asexual reproduction is unlikely to outstrip
traditional procreation in popularity, if for no other reason than that it will
always be the more expensive of the two.61
If, however, the FDA decided to impose restrictions on the rate with which
people could reproduce asexually, it would once more nd itself meddling in the
reproductive choices of private individuals, something it has chosen not to do
in the case of private in vitro fertilization clinics. If it enjoins reproduction by
cloning it will have foreclosed a reproductive possibility for many. Although a
national health risk would militate some such response, its necessarily intimate
consequences should be subject to more political accountability and bioethical
discussion than that to which the FDA is currently subject. Furthermore, if
the FDA were to abandon its precedent for non-involvement in reproductive
decisions, for the sole purpose of prohibiting human cloning, the result would
look suspiciously like a distinction based on the moral repugnance of cloning,
not on the relative safety of one technique over the other. 62 Once more the
60Id.
61See Pence, supra note 55 at 130, citing comments by NIH Director Harold Varmus.
62Legal commentator Susan Wolf argues that it is premature to conclude that cloning is more
dangerous than other forms of reproduction, and proposes that all private sector reproductive
technology should be regulated|with the aid of an advisory board of ethical experts. Susan
M. Wolf, Ban Cloning?: Why NBAC is Wrong, 27 Hastings Center Rep. 12 (Sept.-Oct.
1997).
23FDA would be exceeding the scope of its mission.
IV.
Alternative Forms of Regulation
When the FDA proclaimed its authority to regulate human cloning, it did so
in an environment that lacked federal control over private research and clinics
and at a time when scientists seemed poised on the brink of committing a moral
outrage. As I have argued above, however, calm reection reveals that the FDA
is not the body best suited to making the moral judgments necessary to regu-
late human reproduction; here I will argue that the FDA need not overstep its
authority for fear that lack of regulation will result in catastrophe. My reasons
for this argument are twofold: rst, adequate safeguards are either already in
place or else can be established by existing organizations; second, no scientist
or other entity|even the aspirations of Richard Seed|has evinced an intent to
do harm, and therefore issuing prospective and potentially limiting regulations
would be premature.
Currently a patchwork of legislative and regulatory regimes govern scientic re-
search. Industry self-regulation and ethical guidelines control the rate at which
new technology is developed and introduced at a threshold level.63 Research
that is federally funded is subject to protective regulations for human subjects,
and any other restrictions based on ethical objections developed in conjunction
63See Matthew Merrill, supra note 54 at 184-185.
24with the NBAC. 64 Beyond that, both states and Congress can pass legislation
placing wide bans on certain types of research, whether privately or publicly
funded.65
Contrary to widespread belief that the advent of cloning would result in ethical
chaos within the scientic community, those actors who could make such tech-
nology available have already indicated an unwillingness to rush to do so. For
example, the biotechnology industry imposed on itself a moratorium on human
cloning following the birth of Dolly.66 While Richard Seed's announcement that
he nonetheless intends to establish human cloning clinics appears to render in-
dustry self-regulation ineective, in reality Dr. Seed would need that industry's
resources and participation to make his ambition a reality. Furthermore, his
business would require customers who were themselves comfortable with the
technology in order to stay aoat. His intention to make the technology avail-
able for a prot was clearly in anticipation of a market demand,67 not to force
unwanted and immoral lifeforms on society.
Once cloning technology has been developed, it will also require the participa-
tion of the medical profession to apply the technology to individual consumers,
and here one encounters another layer of protection|that of the AMA's ethical
guidelines. In response to the advent of cloning, the AMA issued a thorough
discussion of the ethical implications of cloning to the medical community, and
64Wolf, supra note 62.
65See Matthew Merrill, supra note 54 at183
66Id. at 184.
67For an exploration of the potential market demand for human cloning, see Eric A. Pos-
ner and Richard A. Posner, The Demand for Human Cloning, in Clones and Clones 233
(Martha C. Nussbaum and Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998).
25stated a series of admonitions that physicians not facilitate human cloning until
some ethical consensus can be achieved:
Individuals do not have a right to demand that physicians participate in
human cloning. Before physicians would be justied in participating in human
cloning, the harms and benets need to be evaluated further with some issues
requiring discussion on a societal level.... There are limits on the types of
procedures to which parents can consent. ...One of standards the Council
recommends is a \best interests test" based on the principles of benecence and
nonmalecence.... The possibility that physicians might play a part in deciding
which persons are or are not \worthy" of cloning is contrary to professional
medical values by all respectable accounts.... The application of cloning for
eugenic or discriminatory practices is incompatible with the ethical norms of
medical practice.68
Finally, international organizations such as the World Medical Association
and the World Health Organization (WHO) have issued their own ethical guide-
lines for human cloning. The World Health Assembly, for example, recom-
mended establishing an investigative body to explore the scientic benets and
ethical risks posed by human cloning, and ultimately recommended a morato-
rium on cloning until such an inquiry was complete.69 Despite public perception
that scientists always pursue technological innovation in complete disregard for
its ethical consequences,70 therefore, it seems clear that these scientists and the
bodies that support their work can be trusted on at least a preliminary level to
monitor themselves.
Beyond the realm of self-regulation exist both state and federal safety nets.
68Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Aairs of the American Medical Association
(June 1999).
69Ethical, Scientic and Social Implications of Cloning in Human Health, W.H.A.51.10,
Fifty-First World Health Assembly, Agenda Item 10, (May 16, 1998)
70Scientists certainly have a checkered past when it comes to respecting the rights of human
subjects, see Kimberly Jackson, supra note 3 at 293, but my assumption here is that the
subsequent rise of the informed consent doctrine as well as increased publicity of experimental
conditions has largely eradicated the likelihood that scientists will create moral atrocities for
the sake of discovery.
26President Clinton has already demonstrated his power to dictate public policy
by banning all federal funds for cloning and ordering the NBAC to conduct an
investigation into its ethical implications.71 In 1995 Congress passed appro-
priations legislation that made federally-funded research on human embryos an
impossibility,72 demonstrating that all research dependent on federal funds can
be brought rmly under the thumb of the federal government. The gap left by
privately-funded research can be covered by state legislatures, as California has
already demonstrated, and as a number of other states have proposed.73
Legislatures and professional organizations, unlike the FDA, are structured
specically to conduct ethical and local political debates and render consequent
determinations in response to a controversial new technology. The biotechnol-
ogy industry and medical community's willingness to self-regulate demonstrates
a clear sense of individual responsibility for caution and reection in the face
of a national debate. The legislative measures of some states, but not oth-
ers, indicates a possibility of geographical variations in opinion and supports
an argument that local regulation may be a preferable alternative to central-
ized oversight. These data suggest that the moral disaster feared from human
cloning is more imaginary than real, and, until some evidence of genuine intent
to do harm comes to light, certainly mandate no role for the FDA. As Professor
Richard Epstein has argued, \these new developments call for no immediate
legal response: Watchful waiting is far preferable to hasty or ill-conceived legis-
71See Wolf, supra note 62.
72Ronald M. Green, Stopping Embryo Research, 9 Health Matrix 235, 238-239 (Summer
1999).
73See Matthew Merrill, supra note 54 at 183.
27lation whose anticipated consequences are likely to do more harm than good."74
V.
Conclusion
When the NBAC conducted its 90-day investigation into the ethical im-
plications of human cloning, it gathered together a panel of experts covering
a range of disciplines: law professors, physicians, research scientists, business
leaders, psychologists, economists, religious members, and bioethicists.75 Its
deliberations included assessments of scientic benets, religious views, cultural
values, and psychological projections.76 The AMA, the WHO, and the biotech-
nology industries all conducted their own ethical inquiries into human cloning,
and made independent recommendations for indenite moratoriums on such re-
search.77 State legislatures have entertained bills that would ban or limit the
development of human cloning in accordance with local sentiment, and the fed-
eral government has long ago banned funding for research on human embryos.78
The FDA, meanwhile, has limited resources and a demanding mission to review
food, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices for safety and eectiveness, and yet
has tried to project its authority into this complicated ethical debate. As I have
argued in Parts II and III above, its statutory authority to do so is tenuous
under a strictly legal construction of the FDCA and related acts, and is incon-
74Richard A. Epstein, A Rush to Caution: Cloning Human Beings, in Clones and Clones
(Martha C. Nussbaum and Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998).
75Susan Cohen, A House Divided, Washington Post, Oct. 12, 1997, Magazine at W12.
76Executive Summary, Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of the Na-
tional Bioethics Advisory Commission, June 1997, at ii-iii.
77See Part IV, supra, and supporting documents.
78See id.
28sistent with its stated mission to ensure safety and remain uninvolved in ethical
or moral debates. Furthermore, unlike under the existing forms of regulation to
which I pointed in Part IV, as a federally-appointed agency the FDA has neither
the popular accountability nor the local representation to justify its involvement
in what should rightfully be a public debate. For these reasons I conclude that
the FDA|even if it could nd authority to regulate human cloning|should not
do so.
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